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Silver Professor; Professor of Economics
Ph.D. 1983 (economics), M.A. 1981 (economics), Cornell University; B.A. 1977 (economics), University of Calcutta.
Email:
Personal Homepage: http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/debraj/
Research Interests: Development economics, microeconomic theory, game theory, Income Distribution, Inequality and Polarization, Coalition Formation in Games
Affiliations: Research Affiliate, Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC), Barcelona; Member, American Economic Association; Member, Econometric Society.
Fellowships/Honors: Guggenheim Fellow, 1997; Fellow of the Econometric Society, since 1993; Medal of the Indian National Science Academy for Outstanding Young Scientists (subarea: mathematics), 1988; Mahalanobis Medal of the Indian Econometric Society, 1989; Gittner Teaching Award (Boston University), 1996; Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching (Stanford), 1986.
Selected Works:
"Persistent Inequality," with D. Mookherjee. Review of Economic Studies 70, 369--393 (2003).
"Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements," with G. Genicot. Review of Economic Studies 70, 87--113 (2003).
"Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process," with H. Konishi. Journal of Economic Theory 110, 1--41 (2003).
"The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements," Econometrica 70, 547--582 (2002).
Development Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998.
Conflict and Distribution, with J. Esteban. Journal of Economic Theory, 87. 1999. 379-415.
Equilibrium Binding Agreements, with R. Vohra. Journal of Economic Theory, 73. 1999. 30-78.
A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints, with B. Dutta. Econometrica, 57. 1989. 615-635.
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